

THE DIRECTOR OF
Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000200010009-6
4856-78

National Intelligence Officers

1 November 1978

NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THRU : Director, NFAC *mlb*

Attached are three more of the NIOs' memoranda. Clearly we have a number of definitional problems to resolve. There is one more on the USSR to come.




Richard Lehman
NIO/Warning

Attachments

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

27 October 1978⁰

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MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM : James R. Lilley
National Intelligence Officer for China

SUBJECT : Draft Warning Report: China

1. Attached is our draft initial warning report based on our discussion of last Thursday. Jim Lilley has asked me to take charge of this endeavor in his absence. Although this report will not be coordinated we welcome your comments, especially if you find what you consider errors of omission or misreflections of our discussion. Please remember that rather than offering judgments as to the likely we are being asked to lean well forward in considering the possible.

2. We will be in touch about next month's meeting: there may be further guidance from the NIO/Warning after he has considered our initial effort. Could I please have any comments either on paper or by phone by 2 November.

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC 4806-78
31 October 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : National Intelligence Officer for Warning⁷²
Director, National Foreign Assessment Center

FROM :
National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe

SUBJECT : Organizational Meeting on Warning and Initial
Report - Western Europe

1. Following a briefing by the National Intelligence Officer for Warning, the West European group had a brief discussion of procedures and agreed as follows:

- that we will plan to meet every fourth Wednesday at 1000;
- I will circulate an agenda of items to be discussed two days before the meeting;
- all agencies are invited to propose items for the agenda, and these will include a one sentence statement of the general thrust;
- ad hoc meetings may be suggested by anyone and may be used to initiate or coordinate an Alert Memorandum;
- the regular sessions will also provide occasion to discuss any pending community business even if not necessarily associated with warning.

2. Concerning how the concept of warning might be made meaningfully applicable to Western Europe, I suggested that we might have a report consisting of two categories of items: The first would be more or less specific things involving some potential "nastiness" the US should be alerted to. This might become a kind of check list of contingencies, and many of

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them could perhaps be handled briefly. The second category would be more in the nature of adverse trends leading up to some untoward consequence for US interests. This seemed to make some sense to most. I then distributed an illustrative agenda, and with some changes and the addition of a couple of other topics, this served as the basis for the following first report:

a. Contingencies Checklist. Berlin - The Soviet and East German governments have again protested that the election of a Berlin mayor as president of the Bundesrat is a violation of Allied agreements. Mayor Stobbe is scheduled to preside over Bundesrat sessions in November and December, and there are precedents for East German attempts to deny him use of ground transit routes to take up his post. The eastern protests have thus far seemed pro forma, however, and we doubt that Moscow will allow its displeasure to threaten larger interests in the West. Azores - There is a new crop of rumors that the Front for the Liberation of the Azores (FLA) may attempt to depose the regional government and declare the islands independent. Sources on the islands doubt that a FLA-engineered coup attempt would attract public support, and while the regional government itself has had ties with the separatist movement, it is currently more interested in the autonomy-under-Lisbon route.

* * * * *

b. Portugal - The designation of Carlos Mota Pinto as prime minister suggests an easing of the three-month government crisis. Mota Pinto is a compromise between the feuding President and the Socialists who, together with the other parties, may now be willing to lend the prime minister limited support. The outlook is nevertheless guarded, and Mota Pinto's failure would likely lead to early -- and probably polarizing -- elections.

c. Spain - With tensions rising in the Basque country, the government is deeply concerned by the continuing problems of low morale and indiscipline in the security services. According to clandestine reports, open talk of work stoppages and strikes has spread from the armed police to the civil guard in the wake of recent terrorist attacks. Resentment of the government's efforts to replace hardliners in key command positions with loyalists to the new regime adds uncertainty to the reliability of either service should the Basque situation seriously worsen.

d. Belgium - The recent collapse of the Tindemans government will prolong indecision on long-pending economic and defense issues, and perhaps adversely affect Belgium's role in the shoring up of Zaire's economy. The new elections, which the caretaker government is expected to hold in about three months, seem unlikely to ease the ethnic issue that has virtually paralyzed the central government in recent years and come close to putting Belgium as a national state in question.

e. Italy - Some community observers are reducing the odds that the Andreotti government will last into next year, and possibly, until after the

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elections to the European Parliament next June. Working against Andreotti are the increasingly hard attacks on the Communists by the "rejuvenated" Socialists, pressures from the rank and file on Berlinguer to bid for a larger slice of influence, and within Andreotti's own party, restiveness on the part of those who are uncomfortable with the role of the Communists and/or are simply ambitious. Working for Andreotti are the Socialists' need to consolidate their recent gains, the unresolved leadership problem of the Christian Democrats, anticipation of some clarification of the Communists' future line at the party congress next March, and the desire of most politicians, particularly the Communists, to avoid an early parliamentary election.

f. Greece-Turkey-NATO - Efforts to achieve Greece's early reintegration into NATO are hung up on Greek-Turkish differences over how to divide up the Aegean commands. The Turks have rejected the interim solution of "no boundaries" that was worked out by General Haig and General Davos and are insisting that agreement be reached at a political level. But both countries think definitive arrangements affect not only their security, but may also set precedents for other, politically-sensitive issues in the Aegean. There are differences of view whether Ecevit's authority has already been seriously eroded by Turkey's continuing economic problems and the unending violence, but it will not be easy for him to appear magnanimous toward the Greeks.



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NFAC 4820-78

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

31 October 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : National Intelligence Officer for Warning^{RL}
Director, National Foreign Assessment Center

FROM : Acting National Intelligence Officer for
East Asia and the Pacific

SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Meeting for East Asia

1. After Dick Lehman's concept briefing, the East Asia group made a tour of the Asian horizon. The discussion was somewhat disjointed, but this only reflected that we have as yet not developed a common understanding as to purpose. This will come, I believe, in short order.

2. Likely developments over the next two to three months center around Indochina and Korea.

-- Vietnam - Cambodia

The key issue in Indochina is whether the Pol Pot regime can hold together and what the Chinese may do to support it. If Pol Pot is overthrown, our other Southeast Asian nations, especially the Thais, would be very concerned.

With the start of this year's dry season, combined with new Soviet military deliveries to Vietnam, there is increased possibility of Vietnamese military moves along the Vietnam-Cambodia border.

There is a possibility that the Pol Pot regime may fall under such pressure, although the odds are probably 70 to 30 against it. In the meantime, the Vietnamese will continue their efforts to build an insurgent political organization that would legitimize Vietnamese-based guerrilla efforts to overthrow the Cambodian regime.

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
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-- Korea

During the next two to three months, there is likely to be a higher level of North Korean military training--especially armor training. This will probably coincide with the pullback of the first US battalion from the Joint Security Area. The stepped-up military training will not necessarily signal an intention to attack, however; it is in keeping with the North's continuing program of improved military training exercises.

There is a real possibility of student demonstrations--with the attendant probability of more arrests by the government of critics of Pak--as the National Assembly elections of 12 December draw near. There is also some danger of demonstrations in connection with Secretary of Defense Brown's visit to Seoul in November.



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